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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert M. Gabaldon, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Brlgham Young University 
Law library 
JPCB 
OPINION 
Case No. 860224-CA 
F I L 
Before Judges Orme, Davidson and Garff. 
Timothy M. Shea 
G A R F F , J u d g e : Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of theft by 
receiving stolen property and his sentence to the Utah State 
Prison by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the 
representative makeup of the jury. 
On April 29, 1986, defendant drove Patricia Ann 
Martinez, her four-year old daughter, and Matthew E. Nevarez 
from Ogden to the Cache Valley Mall in Logan. During the next 
five hours Martinez engaged in a shoplifting spree during which 
she stole $1,150.60 worth of goods, among them a padlock, from 
six different stores, including the Bon, ZCMI and Sunset. 
During this shopping spree, defendant assisted Martinez in 
placing bags of stolen goods in the trunk of his car, was seen 
conferring with Martinez in the ZCMI store, and accompanied 
Nevarez when Nevarez, using an assumed name, obtained a refund 
for stolen goods at Sunset. ZCMI personnel notified police 
that they suspected the foursome of shoplifting. Police 
stopped the group on their return trip to Ogden and, upon 
defendant's consent, searched the vehicle. They found a large 
quantity of stolen items in the car, including a padlock under 
defendant's seat and $142 in defendant's possession. 
Prior to this incident, on March 26, 1986, Bon personnel 
had seen defendant and Martinez in their store. Martinez 
admitted that they had been "casing the joint" in preparation 
for the shoplifting incident on April 29, 1986. 
Martinez pleaded guilty to second degree felony theft. 
A jury convicted defendant and Nevarez of theft by receiving 
stolen property. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve 
one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Defendant's counsel has filed an "Anders brief,H stating 
that he believes the appeal to be wholly frivolous and 
requesting leave to withdraw. In such cases, State v. Clayton, 
639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), is controlling. Clayton adopted the 
conditions of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 
(1967), as binding in the State of Utah and as complying with 
the due process requirements of Article 1, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
The following steps must be complied with to satisfy the 
requirements of Clayton: 
1. Counsel for defendant must be an active advocate on 
behalf of his client, as opposed to merely functioning as an 
amicus curiae. In this case, counsel for defendant submitted a 
brief clearly stating the issues and addressing the legitimate 
points of appeal. 
2. Counsel must support his client's appeal to the best 
of his ability. Here, counsel's arguments on the issues were 
cogent and to the point, he cited accurate authority, and 
argued persuasively in support of defendant's position. 
3. Counsel must find the case to be wholly frivolous 
after a conscientious examination of it, so advise the Court, 
and then request permission to withdraw from the case. Counsel 
made such a finding and request. 
4. The request to withdraw must be accompanied by a 
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal. In the instant case, counsel complied with 
this step and raised all significant points on appeal. 
In raising these points, counsel set forth two primary 
issues: First, did the State present sufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) received or 
retained stolen property; (2) knew or had reason to believe 
items were stolen; and (3) had the requisite intent to deprive 
the owners of their property. Second, did the State deprive 
defendant of his right to a fair and impartial jury trial in 
that he is of Mexican descent and no members of the jury were 
of Mexican descent? 
Appellant was convicted of theft by receiving stolen 
property under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953, as amended), 
which reads as follows: 
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A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, 
or believing that it probably has been 
stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds 
or aids in concealing, selling, or 
withholding any such property from the 
owner, knowing the property to be stolen 
with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof• 
The evidence must show that the defendant knew or believed 
the property was stolen and that he acted purposely to deprive 
the owner of possession of the property. 
Because it is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh 
the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses, 
and it is not the Court's function to substitute its judgment 
for that of the fact-finder, the "Court should only interfere 
when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that 
reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond 
a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 
1980); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977). 
The standard for determining sufficiency of the evidence 
is that the evidence be "so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds could not reasonably believe 
defendant had committed a crime." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 
216, 219 (Utah 1976). In determining whether evidence is 
sufficient, the Court will review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 
1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). Unless there is a clear showing of 
lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. State v. 
Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1977). 
The sheer volume of the goods stolen, that defendant 
personally handled and had the opportunity to observe a 
substantial amount of them, that he and Martinez were seen 
together by store personnel under conditions that suggested a 
common shoplifting enterprise, that store personnel saw 
defendant accompanying Nevarez when Nevarez returned stolen 
property for cash, and that defendant had a padlock and a 
substantial sum of money in his possession when apprehended for 
which no reasonable explanation was given, indicate that there 
was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Thus, 
defendant's first point on appeal is without merit. 
The second issue was whether defendant was deprived of his 
right to a fair and impartial trial in that he is of Mexican 
descent and no members of the jury panel were of Mexican 
descent. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Leqqroan. 25 Utah 2d 
32, 475 P.2d 57, 59 (1970), in which a black defendant appealed 
her conviction on the ground that she was denied a fair trial 
because the selection of the jury unfairly excluded black 
persons, stated: 
[T]here is no evidence whatever that the 
jury was selected by anyone in order 
deliberately to exclude anyone. The only 
suggestion of disproportionate selection 
amounting to prejudice is the happenstance 
that there were only ten women on a 
prospective panel of 50 veniremen chosen 
from the assessment rolls, which certainly 
would not warrant reversal; and such 
suggestion hardly could be implied from the 
fact that defendant was black, because this 
court could almost take note of the fact 
that the black citizens in Salt Lake County 
would represent no more than two per cent of 
the population, give or take a point, — so 
few that it would not be unusual that one or 
more would not be selected by lot. 
In the present case, the trial judge, prior to swearing in 
the jury, denied defendant's objections to the absence of 
minorities on the jury panel on the following grounds: First, 
the panel selection process was done randomly, and second, 
judicial notice was taken that there were few individuals in 
the relevant geographical area who would fit within the 
minority classification. 
Furthermore, defendant's attorneys questioned all jurors 
on voir dire whether or not they had any bad feelings or 
ill-will toward persons of Mexican descent. Because of the 
factual similarity between this case and Leqqroan, Leqqroan is 
controlling, and defendant's second point of appeal is without 
merit. 
5. A copy of the brief must be furnished to the defendant 
and time allowed for him to raise any points that he chooses. 
The brief shows that a copy was mailed to defendant in November 
1986. Defendant submitted a handwritten brief, dated December 
17, 1986, and filed it with the Clerk of the Supreme Court on 
December 22, 1986. In his pro se brief, defendant raised three 
issues: the money found in his possession on April 29, 1986, 
was received from unemployment insurance, the padlock in his 
car was one he had purchased on April 29, 1986, for which 
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he had a receipt, and he was inadequately represented by 
counsel because he saw counsel only twice before trial and was 
not able to contact him by telephone. 
These issues are without merit for the following reasons: 
First/ defendant chose not to testify at trial. That decision 
necessarily meant that the jury would not have the benefit of 
defendant's version of how he came into possession of the 
padlock and cash.1 Second, counsel was present at all 
critical stages of the proceeding, and his conduct was 
competent and professional. 
6. The Court, after full examination of the proceedings, 
must then decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. A 
review of the briefs, the applicable legal authority, the 
record, and the transcript indicate that this appeal is wholly 
frivolous and without merit. Counsel's request to withdraw is 
granted and the conviction is affirmed. 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Parts of defendant's version of what happened did come to the 
jury's attention notwithstanding his decision not to testify. For 
example, the arresting officer's testimony included several 
references to defendant's claim at the time of arrest that he had 
purchased the padlock at Osco Drug in Ogden. 
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